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ABSTRACT: Libet and colleagues, and later many others investigated brain activity during 
voluntary action. They found that electrophysiological "readiness potentials" (RPs) precede 
awareness of intention to act (W). They also found that awareness of actually moving i.e., 
initiation of motor command (M) follows W, and action follows M; after W, the decision to act 
can be consciously vetoed until the action actually starts. Libet proposed that one’s brain 
initiates voluntary acts but not one’s conscious will, and that conscious will can still control the 
outcome by vetoing the action. In this article, we explain why the above experimental 
observations (RP start, W, M, conscious veto) occur in the order they do, using the two-time 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. We take into account the general and objective 
observation that a voluntary action needs to use information pertaining to the desired future 
state (to go to New York, I take a train to New York not to Philadelphia). This observation is 
confirmed by cognitive scientists as they state that the mental image of the future must become 
the content of the present memory as a prerequisite to such action and that our brains are 
endowed with the ability to create ‘memories of the future’, i.e., neural models of something 
that, as of yet does not exist but which we want to bring into existence. 
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1 Editor’s note: Foundations of Mind, the independent research group that has provided the papers for this 
special edition, has never taken either corporate or state money and is financed entirely by donations. 
Authors keep copyright without paying. The typical fee for this charged by open-access journals such as 
those published by PLOS, is around $2k. If you value this project, and wish to see further such 
proceedings from this group, we ask you to consider donating to Foundations of Mind – as little as $5 per 
download, through their website: http://www.foundationsofmind.org/donate. This will ensure there will 
be further published proceedings on the foundations of mind like this one for you and others to enjoy free. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Libet and colleagues (1983) performed various experiments investigating brain activity 
in voluntary action and found that voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological 
"readiness potentials" (RPs).  They found that the RP shift began at about 550 msec 
before movement actually took place, for spontaneous acts involving no preplanning. 
The time of conscious intention to act was obtained from the subject's recall of the 
spatial clock position of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of intending 
or wanting to move (W). W occurred at about 200 msec before the action (Libet et al., 
1983).  Subjects distinguished awareness of wanting to move from awareness of actually 
moving (M). Libet associated M to the awareness of initiation of motor command and 
initiation of efferent cerebral output for the movement. In Libet et al.’s experiments, W 
times were consistently and substantially in advance of mean times reported for M.  
Not only did Libet et al. found that a spontaneous voluntary act is initiated 
unconsciously by the brain but they also found that the decision to act could be 
consciously controlled during the remaining 150 msec or so after the awareness of 
intention to act appears. Subjects could in fact "veto" motor performance during a 100-
200 msec period before a prearranged time to act.  Hence Libet proposed that 
conscious control can be exerted to select or control volitional outcome before the final 
motor outflow. The preparatory cerebral processes associated with an RP can and do 
develop even when an already intended motor action is vetoed at approximately at the 
time that W normally occurs. The important events in the experiments of Libet et al. 
(1983) investigating brain activity in voluntary action are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Below, we explain why the above experimental observations (RP start, W, M, 
conscious veto) occur in the order they do, using the two-time interpretation of 
quantum mechanics while noting the scientific observation by cognitive scientists that 
the mental image of the future must become the content of the present memory as a 
prerequisite to any intentional/purposeful action. 
W = awareness of 
intention 
M = awareness of 
initiation of action 
Figure 1. Milestones in a Libet et. al.’s self-initiated voluntary act experiment 
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NEURAL CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Since we will use the concept of neural correlates of consciousness in our analysis of 
Libet’s experiments, let us recall how neuroscientists describe neural correlates of 
consciousness. Mormann and Koch (2007) for example, say that “every phenomenal, 
subjective state will have associated Neural Correlates of Consciousness: one for seeing 
a red patch, another one for seeing grandmother, yet a third one for hearing a siren, 
etc. Perturbing or inactivating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness for any one 
specific conscious experience will affect the percept or cause it to disappear. If the 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness could be induced artificially, for instance by 
cortical micro-stimulation in a prosthetic device or during neurosurgery, the subject 
would experience the associated percept.”  Thus, a complete and healthy neural 
correlate is necessary and sufficient for the corresponding conscious experience to 
occur. 
 
 
Since the examples given above all happen to be sensory experiences, a typical 
sensory experience is shown in Figure 2 to illustrate that 
• The NC is not identical with its ‘meaning’, which is what the first person is 
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looking at? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sensory experience and its neural correlate 
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aware of. The NC is physical whereas the ‘meaning’ is nonmaterial. The first 
person is aware of the ‘meaning’ but not aware of the NC whereas any third 
person can see only the NC’s picture but does not know the ‘meaning’ unless 
the former reports it to the latter using some material means of 
communication. Briefly put, the first person’s experience is subjective.  
• The NC is a map, a neural representation of the sensory input2; without the 
input, the NC of the input does not exist.  
 
A digression:  In the example of Figure 1, if we have a computer equipped with a 
camera instead of a human subject, then the computer would create a mapping/record 
of the book on the table in its memory similarly to the brain’s creating the NC, which is 
a neural map/record of the observed object. The computer can send a picture of the 
object onto the monitor screen; it can announce that it saw a book on a table if it is 
equipped with a suitable program in advance. Once the computer has a record of an 
object (and required instructions), it can simulate almost any observable action that a 
human being can perform involving the object but it does not have any conscious 
experience; it is not aware of seeing (or hearing, etc.) the object, or doing anything at 
all with the object. The computer is not aware of the ‘meaning’ of the record which it 
creates because it never creates the ‘meanings’ of its records, i.e., pieces of ‘real 
information’ which exist in our brains (in living beings in general). All records (both 
data and programs) in a classical or quantum computer’s memory are 
material/physical; ‘meanings’ are assigned to them by the programmer. Unlike the 
computer, when the brain receives sensory inputs, both a neural map of the inputs and 
the ‘meaning’ of the map are created. We propose that the ‘meaning’ and awareness of 
it by the brain’s owner are results of the brain’s interaction with the so called mind 
when it pays attention to the brain. The attention involved in creating the awareness 
component of a sensory experience may be called Process 1 of the von Neumann 
interpretation of quantum mechanics as explained by Stapp (2011) because to pay 
attention is to probe for new information. Most probably, such a mind is not present in 
a classical or quantum computer. 
                                                          
2 In the book, “programs of the brain”,  JZ Young (1978) recognizes that information is carried by physical 
entities, such as books or sound waves or brains, but it is not itself material. Using the analogy of encoding 
information in a computer, he says that life is guided by the brain’s programs written in neural scripts that 
are implemented in human action. He says that the detailed characteristics of the cells in the brain 
provide the code for features of the world, such as a particular line or sound, or the color red. What goes 
on in the brain provides a faithful representation of events outside, and the arrangement of the cells in it 
provides a detailed model of the world.  
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MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE 
Not only sensory experiences have neural correlates but our goals, plans, and 
intentions have neural correlates as well. Baars and Gage (2010) point out that “human 
cognition is forward-looking, proactive rather than reactive and that transition from 
mostly reactive to mostly proactive behavior is among the central themes of the 
evolution of the nervous system. We have visions of the future and formulate goals, 
plans, hopes, and ambitions, all of which pertain to the future and not to the past. 
Then we act according to our goals but to do so, these mental images of the future 
must become the content of our memory; thus the ‘memories of the future’ are formed. 
The frontal lobes endow the organism with the ability to create neural models as a 
prerequisite for making things happen, models of something that, as of yet does not 
exist but which you want to bring into existence.” 
We can make two general, logical and objective observations about voluntary 
actions which are confirmed by the findings of cognitive scientists as stated above:   
1. an intentional action with a purpose or goal whether significant or trivial, 
begins in the present while the goal is in the future;  
2. the action needs to use information pertaining to the desired future state; if I 
want to go to NY, I will take a train to NY but not to Philadelphia. 
ACTION OF THE MIND ON THE BRAIN 
If building the goal record (a neural model of something that as of yet does not exist) is 
a prerequisite for the required action to take place, where does the brain get the 
information about a future state of itself? The answer to this question cannot be that all 
the information comes from the environment and past memory although for example, 
when the goal is to reach a visual object, the brain uses inputs from the environment to 
create a neural correlate (NC) of the goal. The scientist infers from the organism’s 
behavior and location of the NC, whether it is a goal or something the organism has 
only seen but has no desire to reach. So, whatever scientists observe is not what tells 
the brain to build a model of the future state. The point is that there is no time 
information in any sensory input received from the environment. Hence the questions: 
who assigns the label “future” as opposed to “past” or “present” to the neural model?  
“Who initiates the goal record creation?” deserve to be thought through. It would be 
reasonable to assume that the physical brain cannot initiate a new process all by itself 
(because it would be against the law of causal closure).  Even if one argues that the 
physical brain is a quantum system, and that spontaneous quantum processes such as 
spontaneous emission happen, such processes happen because of the system being in 
an unstable state as far as is known. Moreover, the decay phenomenon is irreversible 
whereas in the case of voluntary actions, one can always have a change of mind until 
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the action has started and even afterwards if the duration of action is long enough.  In 
addition, it seems reasonable to assume that will/volition is not a result of instability. 
Even the notion called “downward causation” used to explain emergence and self-
organization phenomena of some physical, chemical, and biological systems does not 
answer the above questions because downward causation is irreversible also. 
 
 
Thus the questions: “how does the brain acquire in its present memory, 
information regarding a possible future physical state of itself, “who initiates the goal 
record creation, and “who initiates action?” arise.  We ASSUME that a mental aspect, 
which we usually call intention or volition initiates creation of goal and action plan 
records and initiates action as well.  
The two general observations in the previous section and the scientific observations of 
cognitive scientists that the brain creates neural models of the purpose/goal and a plan 
of action as a prerequisite for action (Baars and Gage 2010) imply the milestones in the 
performance of a voluntary action shown in Figure 3. Intention/volition and other 
endogenous inputs from past experiences stored in the brain’s memory are used by it to 
build the neural models of the goal and action plan. 
Action plan 
2 
  
  
Action of mind on the brain: mind’s input to the brain to build 
neural records of goal and action plan, and initiation of action 
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Figure 3. Sequence of Milestones in a Voluntary Action 
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QUANTUM COLLAPSE IN THE BRAIN AND AWARENESS OCCURRENCE 
In general, quantum theorists of consciousness assume that awareness of an external 
event or a thought, intention, etc., is accompanied by a collapse of the quantum brain’s 
wavefunction. The assumption is consistent with the dynamic core hypothesis of 
Edelman (2000), who says that occurrence of a conscious state rules out or 
discriminates among billions of other states, each of which may lead to a different 
potential consequence and that this discrimination happens so fast that it is not 
achievable at present by a man-made artifact (Edelman, 2000; p.147).  He calls this 
ability of the brain to actualize one state among several possible ones as differentiation. 
Accepting von Neumann’s suggestion that Heisenberg quantum jumps occur 
precisely at the high level of brain activity that corresponds to conscious events, Stapp 
(1995) also explains that there is an actual ‘happening’ in a particular ‘register’ of the 
brain that corresponds to the occurrence of having an awareness of a particular belief, 
thought, etc. This happening is the quantum jump that shifts the value of amplitude 
associated with this register from some value less than unity to the value unity. This 
jump constitutes the Heisenberg ‘actualization’ of the particular brain state that 
corresponds to this belief/thought. Assuming that awareness of an event occurs along 
with a collapse of the quantum brain’s wavefunction, Wolf (1998) offered a quantum-
physical explanation in support of Libet’s delay-and- antedating hypothesis (Libet et al., 
1979) regarding the timing of the conscious sensation of a sensory stimulus.  Wolf ’s 
assumption is therefore justified by the results of Libet’s experiments.  
Thus collapse of the brain’s wavefunction is assumed to be a necessary condition 
for occurrence of a conscious experience.  
Using the two-time interpretation of quantum mechanics (TTIQM) we will show 
that completion by the quantum brain (QB), of an observable neural model (neural 
map, model, record, or representation are all the same as neural correlate) of sensory 
or endogenous input implies a corresponding collapse of the QB’s  wavefunction. This 
will allow us to justify the order of occurrence of the events W and M, and conscious 
veto as reported by Libet et al.  
SEQUENCE OF QUANTUM BRAIN’S WAVEFUNCTON COLLAPSES IN 
LIBET’S  FINGER RAISING EXPERIMENTS 
The preceding discussion suggests the following sequence of events in Libet’s “finger 
lifting” experiments.  
1. Intention initiates RP to build a neural model of the goal state (a future 
position of the finger different from the present one), as prerequisite to action. 
Completion of an observable neural record requires the QB’s wavefunction to 
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collapse giving rise to awareness of the intention (W). Thus, awareness of 
intention occurs after RP progresses enough. The collapse will be seen to be 
onto the eigenspace of a degenerate eigenvalue of the future-finger-position 
observable of the brain.  
2. The RP activity continues to build potential action plans, which include the 
above neural model. Another quantum collapse of the brain indicates 
completion, choice, activation of the plan, and awareness of readiness to act 
(M).  
3. After figuring out what to do, one may or may not act upon it. So, either 
intention initiates action, or veto (change of mind) stops activity already in 
progress. Using TTIQM, we explain why veto is felt as being conscious.  
W OCCURRENCE – THIRD PERSON VIEW 
The neural correlate (NC) of the raised position of the finger (RPF) is an observable of 
the quantum brain (QB) with eigenvalues 1) YES, if the NC is complete and different 
from the present position, 2) NO, if otherwise. 
The neural model of the future position of the finger is similar to a ‘data record’ in 
a computer and always passive. Action plan is similar to a ‘program record’; it has to be 
activated (by intention) after it is completed (the quantum zeno effect of Process 1 
described by Stapp (2011) may come into play here). Hence the activation status (AS) of 
the action plan is an observable of QB with eigenvalues: 1) ACTIVE, and 2) 
INACTIVE. QB may receive the trigger value any time while it receives cortical 
inputs.  
The Hilbert space Η of the states of QB is three dimensional with an orthonormal 
basis consisting of the state vectors: |(YES, ACTIVE)>, |(YES, INACTIVE)>, and 
|(NO, INACTIVE)>, where the first label shows the eigenvalue of the observable RPF 
and the second label shows the eigenvalue of the observable AS. RPF and AS provide 
a complete set of commutating operators on Η.  
We assume that the brain has mechanisms R and R’ to measure and report the 
eigenvalues of RPF and AS respectively. Let R’ be the finger moving mechanism. From 
an observation of the finger position a third person would infer that the finger moved 
from its initial position and therefore that the action plan was activated. If the finger 
does not move, the observer does not know whether QB is in the state  
|(YES, INACTIVE)>, or in |(NO, INACTIVE)>, but assume it to be in a 
superposition of the two. The observer has to question the first person to find this 
information. Hence let R be the mechanism that can measure RPF eigenvalues and 
make them reportable (causing the wavefunction to collapse into one of the eigenstates 
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of RPF) so that the first person can report it to others. On the other hand, if R’ shows a 
finger position different from its initial position, then the third person can infer that the 
finger moved and also that the RPF value is YES, in other words, that QB collapsed 
into |YES, ACTIVE>.  
We also assume that the measurement is ideal, that is, when R or R’ communicate 
an observable state of QB to the outside world, it does so with minimal disturbance to 
the QB state. 
 
Initially at t=tRP, the finger is observed in the initial position. So the state of QB is a 
superposition such as  
|QB(tRP)> = a|YES, INACTIVE > + b|NO, INACTIVE>. 
After receiving cortical input and progress of RP, at t= t0< tmv, let the state of QB 
evolve to  
|QB(t0)> = α |(YES, INACTIVE) > + β|(NO, INACTIVE)> + χ|(YES, ACTIVE)>.       (1) 
Since the action plan cannot be completed before the neural model of the finger’s 
future position is completed, let us first consider a measurement of the QB state by 
means of R. At t=t0, the state of QB, R, and environment E is 
|ψ(t0)> = {α |(YES, INACTIVE) > + β|(NO, INACTIVE)> + χ|(YES, ACTIVE)>} ⊗ |R(t0)> 
⊗|E(R(t0), R’(t0))>, 
where |R(t0)> is the state of R ready to read QB state, and |E(R(t0), R’(t0))> denotes 
the environment state corresponding to the states of R and R’ at t=t0. After interaction 
and entanglement of QB with R, at t0 < t1 < tmv, the combined system of QB, R, and E 
evolves to  
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|ψ(t1)> = {α|(YES, INACTIVE)> ⊗|R(YES)> + χ|(YES, ACTIVE)> ⊗ |R(YES)> + β|(NO, 
INACTIVE)> ⊗ |R(NO)>} ⊗|E(t0, R’(t0))> 
because R tries to read the value of the observable RPF only and does not care about 
AS the state of R’, which does not change at this time.  After decoherence in the 
environment in a short time ϵ, the state of the combined QB, R and E is 
 
|ψ(t1+ϵ)> = α|(YES, INACTIVE)> ⊗|R(YES)>⊗|E(YES, R’(t0))> + χ|(YES, ACTIVE)> ⊗ 
|R(YES)> ⊗|E(YES, R’(t0))> 
+β|(NO, INACTIVE)> ⊗ |R(NO)>  ⊗|E(NO, R’(t0))> 
Since the finger is seen in a position different from the initial position after tmv, at any 
time t > tmv, it is reasonable to assume that the first person, if asked to do so, can and 
would report that he/she is  intentionally raising the finger during this time. Therefore 
the post boundary condition for the combined system of R and E is that 
 
for t ≥ tmv, the state of R and E is  <R(YES)| ⊗ <E( YES, R’(t))|, 
where bra notation indicates a backward evolving state. The backward evolving state of 
the combined system for t2 ≥ tmv  is 
 
<Φ(t2)| = <ϕ|⊗<R(YES)| ⊗ <E(YES, R’(t2))|, 
where ϕ is the state of QB after possible further inputs (a superposition different from 
that in equation (1). 
In the interval t1+ϵ < t< t2, the combined system is described by the two-state 
density matrix: 
ρ(t) = |ψ(t1+ϵ)> <Φ(t2)| 
Because environment states |E(YES, R’(t))> and |E(NO, R’(t))> are approximately 
orthogonal, tracing out environmental degrees of freedom removes all terms containing 
|E(NO, R’(t))>.  Ignoring normalization, the reduced density matrix, for t1+ϵ < t< t2 
Trace-env (ρ(t)) = {α|(YES, INACTIVE)> <ϕ| + χ|(YES, ACTIVE)><ϕ|} ⊗ |R(YES)> 
<R(YES)|        (2) 
This means that QB state partially collapses to Η(YES), the state spanned by |(YES, 
ACTIVE)> and  
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(YES, INACTIVE)>, and remains in Η(YES) in the time interval (t1+ϵ, t2). The 
partial collapse which keeps QB state in the subspace that corresponds to the 
eigenvalue YES means that the neural model of the future finger position is already 
completed. This suggests that W, the awareness of the intention, that is, awareness of 
where the finger should be in the future, occurs in this time interval along with the 
partial collapse. Since the collapse occurs only after receiving cortical input and 
building the neural model of the future state, awareness of intention occurs only after 
RP progresses enough.  
 
M Occurrence – Third Person View 
 
As said before, the action plan is completed only after the neural model of the 
future state is completed and therefore not before tw, the time of occurrence of W. 
After receiving further inputs, QB interacts with the measuring/reporting mechanism 
R’ at t= t3 where tw < t3 < tmv; afterwards, in a short time δ, entanglement with the 
environment E and decoherence happen. The forward evolving state of the combined 
system of QB, R’, and E at t= t3+δ is 
 
|ψ(t3+δ)> = c|(YES, ACTIVE)> ⊗|R’(ACTIVE)>⊗|E(YES, ACTIVE)>  
+ d|(YES, INACTIVE) > ⊗|R’(INACTIVE)> ⊗ |E(YES, INACTIVE)>, 
where the first argument of the environment state is YES because the QB state is 
already in the subspace Η(YES) due to partial collapse. The post-boundary condition is 
that for t ≥ tmv, the state of the combined system R’ and E is 
 
<R’(ACTIVE)|⊗ <E(YES, ACTIVE)|               (3) 
and the backward evolving state of the combined system of QB, R’, and E, for t ≥ tmv is  
Movement 
onset 
 
 
W  
 
 
tw = - 200  msec 
 
tmv  = 0 
 
M = Awareness of 
action initiation Cortical 
input 
 
 
Action 
 
 Figure 5. M Occurrence  
 
 
 
tM   = - 86 msec 
 
 SYAMALA D. HARI 67 
<Ψ(t)| = <ϕ|⊗ <R’(ACTIVE)|⊗ <E(YES, ACTIVE)|. 
Again, ϕ indicates possible further interactions of QB with other micro or macro 
systems. In the interval t3+δ< t≤ tmv, the combined system of QB, R’, and E is 
described by the two-state density matrix: 
ρ(t) = |ψ(t3+δ)> <Ψ(t)| 
Tracing out environmental degrees of freedom and ignoring normalization, the 
reduced density matrix, for t3+δ< t≤ tmv,  
Trace-env (ρ(t)) = |(YES, ACTIVE)><ϕ|⊗|R(YES)> <R(YES)| 
QB state reduction occurs in the time interval (t3+δ, tmv) and the awareness M of 
activation of action plan occurs along with state reduction. M does not occur if veto 
occurs before action initiation because then the post boundary condition for R’ and E 
is not (3) as will be seen below. 
 
Conscious Veto 
 
 
The veto may come any time after W and before movement occurs. It means that the 
QB is instructed by an intention to set the value of the activation trigger to INACTIVE 
instead of ACTIVE as was the case in the M-occurrence scenario.  Since the 
instruction is to stop all activity immediately and no movement of the finger is seen 
experimentally, the post boundary condition in this case is that 
 
for t ≥ tw, the state of R’, and E is <R’(INACTIVE)|⊗<E(YES, INACTIVE)|.     (4) 
 
If tv is the time when the brain receives veto, it can be seen as in the case of M-
occurrence, that collapse to the state |(YES, INACTIVE)> occurs in the interval tv 
and tv+ε for an; and that awareness of veto happens along with the collapse in the 
interval (tv tv+ε). Since ε is infinitesimally small, the awareness of the veto occurs 
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almost immediately. There is debate in the neuroscientist community, whether the veto 
intention is also preceded by its own RP. This debate has no bearing on the present 
analysis; even if veto requires a preceding RP, it would be included in the cortical input 
mentioned above and the post boundary condition associated with the veto does not 
change from (4). That the finger should never move implies that the wavefunction 
should collapse within an infinitesimally short time after receiving veto endogenously, 
and therefore the awareness of veto occurs at the same time as well.  
ENDNOTE 
Experiments first performed by Libet et.al (1983; 1985) and later by many others seem 
to show that the brain but not our conscious will is what initiates voluntary acts. But 
our perception is otherwise; we think that the conscious intention to achieve a desired 
future state causes us to take the required action. This feeling occurs probably because 
no required action would be taken if there is no conscious intention to achieve the goal, 
or if there is a conscious change of mind; moreover, the conscious decision to act does 
precede the action as verified by the same experiments. Hence the finding that pursuit 
of our goals is prepared unconsciously, at least in the earlier moments before we act on 
them appears to challenge our traditional belief in free will. However, once we 
recognize that the human brain is a quantum system, according to the analysis above, 
the sequence of awareness events found in such experiments should not be surprising. 
Actually, research to find neural basis for unconscious thought is on-going (for example, 
see Dijksterhuis (2013)). Neural and psychological data found from experiments 
conducted by cognitive scientists show that unconscious will plays a role in goal setting 
and activation (Custers and Aarts, 2010). 
On the other hand, Libet’s proposals were considered controversial by many 
cognitive scientists and ignited vigorous debates when he first announced them. The 
controversy continues even today probably because we know volition or will intuitively 
but we do not have rigorous definitions for subjective notions such as volition, will, 
goal-oriented-ness, planning, intentionality etc. Although they all involve making 
decision with regard to a future state, they are all different from a strictly psychological 
point of view. For example, psychologist Breitmeyer (1985) thought that of finger/wrist 
flexion used in Libet’s experiments does not have any meaningful purpose and 
therefore cannot be taken as a typical voluntary action. Recently, Maoz et.al. (2017) 
expressed similar views as their experiments showed RPs associated with arbitrary 
decisions as expected but the RPs were strikingly absent for deliberate decisions (a 
deliberate decision has a more significant consequence than an arbitrary decision, for 
example, which clothes to wear to what route to take to work versus decisions about life 
partners and career choices).  
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